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Deuss’ demise: an oil trader’s struggle to keep up with the market, 1970s-
1990s 
 
Marten Boon (University of Oslo)1 
 
Introduction 
Joseph Schumpeter argued that entrepreneurship is essential to 
understanding why markets, economies and societies change and as such 
entrepreneurs should be studied within their temporal and spatial context.2 
This paper sets out from that premise in an attempt to shed more light on the 
link between entrepreneurship among oil traders and the development of the 
global oil market between the 1970s and 1990s. International trade 
intermediaries, to use a generalized term for trading companies, perform an 
important role in the international trading system in many commodity 
markets because they are assumed to reduce transaction costs, absorb risks 
and gather and disseminate information, which provide liquidity, efficiency 
and flexibility to markets.3  
They do so by arbitraging between price discrepancies deriving from 
demand and supply mismatches by transforming commodities in time, space 
and quality, earning a premium from those activities.4 As intermediaries, 
trading companies always find themselves competing with producers and 
 
1 marten.boon[ad]iakh.uio.no 
2 G. Jones and R. D. Wadhwani, "Entrepreneurship," in The Oxford Handbook of Business 
History, ed. G. Jones and J. Zeitlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 501-528. 
3 Robert J. Wiener, “Do Crises Tear the Fabric of Oil Trade?,” working paper DP 06-16, 
Resources for the Future (Washington, 2006) 3; Mark Casson, "The Economic Analysis of 
Multinational Trading Companies," in The Multinational Traders, ed. G. Jones (London: 
Routledge, 1998) 22-47 23-4; Thomas Roehl, "A Transaction Cost Approach to International 
Trading Structures : The Case of the Japanese General Trading Companies," Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Economics 24 (1983) 2: 119-35, here: 128.  
4 S. C. Pirrong, The Economics of Commodity Trading Firms (Houston: University of Houston, 
2014) 6. 
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consumers who might chose to internalize trading, either to incur arbitrage 
premiums or to reduce transaction or agency costs.5 As such, the level of 
competition depends on the level of trading acumen of producer and 
consumer companies, a learning curve that is clearly perceptible in the history 
of the oil market.6 In addition, as markets mature and information becomes 
more readily available, trading companies are pressed to remain relevant.7 
Diversification into other commodities or some level of forward and 
backward integration in the supply chain are means to offset some of those 
external threats.8 However, this strongly affects the business and ownership 
models of pure trading companies. Pure trading activities benefit most from a 
private ownership model, with owner-managers bearing most of the risks, 
which can be easily hedged in derivatives, credit and insurance markets.9 
Asset investments – to offset encroaching competition or increasing market 
transparency – are less compatible with the private ownership model because 
the associated risks are larger and less easily hedged. Owner-managers face 
the choice of bearing those risks, take (part of) the company public or secure 
other means of outside funding, by floating bond issues for instance.  
Building and maintaining a trading company is therefore a very 
dynamic venture that moves in conjunction with market and industry 
developments and requires considerable entrepreneurial creativity. Trading 
companies are a ubiquitous phenomenon in history but in contrast to other 
commodity markets, such as grain, coffee, cocoa or certain base metals, the 
commodification and market trading of oil is a very recent phenomenon, 
 
5 Anne C. Perry, "The Evolution of the U.S. International Trade Intermediary in the 1980s: A 
Dynamic Model," Journal of International Business Studies 21 (1990) 1: 133-53, here: 144. 
6 The trading and supply units of BP, Shell and TOTAL are considered top-tier traders in the 
oil market, which were setup already in the 1970s. 
7 Pirrong, The Economics of Commodity Trading Firms, 36. 
8 J.-F. Hennart and G.M. Kryda, "Why Do Traders Invest in Manufacturing?," in The 
Multinational Traders, ed. G. Jones (London: Routledge, 1998) 213-27, 214-5. 
9 Pirrong, The Economics of Commodity Trading Firms, 34-5. 
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which went from almost completely internalized to largely market traded in 
under 20 years. Oil spot markets developed out of the conundrum of the 
1970s price shocks into the principal means of exchanging oil globally. But, 
because integrated major oil companies (MOCs) had lost control over the 
production of crude oil in the 1970s, they grappled with supply security.10 
And while national oil companies (NOCs) in producing countries 
increasingly controlled production, their inexperience with marketing left 
them grappling with demand security.11 Many independent trading 
companies of all shapes and sizes maneuvered themselves as intermediaries 
between the two.   
Between the 1970s and the 1990s, these companies evolved rapidly as 
their business models, strategies and entrepreneurial behavior were tested by 
a series of major demand and supply shocks. In addition, oil markets became 
more transparent and better organized, bringing in other participants such as 
banks seeking investment and trading opportunities. Moreover, MOCs and 
NOCs honed their trading operations, increasing the competition for 
independent trading companies. Over the course of three decades oil trading 
companies have developed from small, one-man brokerage operations into 
large diversified and sometimes publicly listed companies.  
Although a number of longstanding commodity trading companies 
(Philipp Brothers, Cargill) were active in the oil market from the 1970s 
onwards, the largest oil trading companies today grew out of newly formed 
specialized oil trading firms that emerged over the course of three decades, 
such as Vitol (1966), Glencore (1974), Trafigura (1993). Whereas this handful 
of firms are large global players today, they shared their founding years with 
 
10 Coby van der Linde, Dynamic International Oil Markets : Oil Market Developments and 
Structure, 1860-1990 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991) 189. 
11 Valerie Marcel and John V. Mitchell, Oil Titans National Oil Companies in the Middle East 
(London: Chatham House, 2006) 16. 
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a very large number of oil trading entrepreneurs that were successful once 
but left the scene, some failing spectacularly, others silently retreating. The 
focus of this paper is on those specialized, privately owned oil trading firms. 
The entrepreneurial role of the founding owner-managers is most crucial. 
Their centrality in the longevity of privately owned firms makes them 
particularly interesting from an entrepreneurship perspective. This paper 
therefore question how and why oil trading companies have emerged and 
evolved during the formative years of the oil market and why some endured 
and expanded while others grew large but disappeared again. These 
questions will be explored through a single case study of a once world 
renowned oil trader, John Deuss, who emerged in the 1970s, headed a globe-
spanning group of companies in the 1970s and 1980s only to disappear from 
oil trading again in the 1990s. This paper questions his entrepreneurial 
strategy and creativity by tracing his company’s history through a series of 
major upheavals in the oil market. 
 
The birth pangs of the oil market 
In the late 1970s, oil-producing countries, particularly the members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC, founded in 1960), 
increased their control over crude oil production and revenues.12 Between the 
turn of the twentieth century and the Second World War, multinational oil 
companies gained almost full control over world oil production through a 
system of concessions and cross-ownership of those concessions. Their power 
over production and pricing was the main reason for the foundation of OPEC 
in 1960. Nonetheless, concessions were challenged in several instances before 
1960, for instance in Mexico (nationalization in 1938), Venezuela (50:50 profit 
sharing in 1947) and Iran (nationalization in 1951). The Venezuelan model 
 
12 Ibid., 16ff.  
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was gradually implemented in other concessions, but the influence of 
producer states over their own oil resources remained limited to the taxation 
of concession holders.  
Increasing producer state control over production across the board 
began in earnest after OPEC’s Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in 
Member Countries of June 1968. Decolonization, (resource) nationalism and 
the ensuing growing need for oil revenues in oil producing countries led to 
increasing state interference. State-owned National Oil Companies (NOCs) 
were established in Algeria, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya and a host of other countries 
throughout the 1960s. The process accelerated in the 1970s and concessions 
were either nationalized or NOCs given an increasingly larger stake in 
existing and new concessions, so-called participations. Instead of controlling 
production, MOCs increasingly relied on long-term contracts with NOCs. 
Emboldened by success in the late 1960s and early 1970s, OPEC attempted to 
use its increasing control over production to drive up oil prices by way of 
using oil embargos and increased participation to push up prices and 
government take.13 Anticipated OPEC supply and price actions drove up spot 
prices through speculative hoarding during 1978, which supplied OPEC 
countries with legitimation to raise contract prices. In addition, OPEC tried to 
restrict reselling.14  
The price shocks, particularly 1979, caused a global economic 
slowdown, declining demand for oil and looming overproduction and 
overcapacity in the oil market. Moreover, the opportunistic behavior of oil 
producing states in pursuit of higher revenues, had weaned MOCs of 
committing to long-term contracts with NOCs, particularly in the aftermath of 
the 1979 Iran crisis, which left a lot of oil companies out to dry and struggling 
 
13 M. A. Adelman, The Genie out of the Bottle: World Oil since 1970 (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 
1995) 118-122. 
14 Ibid., 192-3. 
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to meet their supply requirements. Prices over the course of 1979 and early 
1980 shot up, but demand reacted rapidly and prices soon faced downward 
pressure.15 Companies that had closed long-term contracts with NOCs against 
staggering prices just to secure supply during the crisis were left stuck with 
heavily overpriced supplies. This created an increasing appetite among 
MOCs to buy on the spot or through spot-related short-term contracts rather 
than being exposed to the price risk of being tied to long-term, fixed price 
contracts. More flexibility in procurement also meant more flexibility in 
tuning refinery runs to market conditions. In addition, spot sales allowed 
OPEC producers to compete for market share in a falling market.16 
 The early spot market was rather small, but by the early 1980s an 
estimated share of between 80-90 per cent of crude oil was traded on the spot 
or through spot related contracts.17 Over the course of the 1970s, the combined 
factors of the disintegrating oil supply chain, increased marketing by and 
demand for intermediation on behalf of NOCs, a growing appetite for spot 
buying and the speculative opportunities of the OPEC price increases all 
contributed to rapidly expand the size of the spot market for crude oil (see 
Figure 2 in the Appendix). This attracted increasing numbers of traders 
spotting opportunities to profit from the speculative and intermediation 
opportunities deriving from OPECs assertion of power over oil production.18 
Data from the early 1980s indicates that by 1983-4 independent trading 
companies were the counterpart in at least 25 per cent of all recorded crude 
 
15 Ibid., 190. 
16 H.  Razavi, The New Era of Petroleum Trading : Spot Oil, Spot-Related Contracts, and Futures 
Markets, World Bank Technical Paper (Washington DC: The World Bank, 1989) 4. 
17 Ibid., 1. 
18 Anecdotal evidence is given in: Daniel Ammann, The King of Oil: The Secret Lives of Marc 
Rich (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2009) 82-6; H.  Hurt III, "Feasting on the Oil Glut," Texas 
Monthly 11 (1984) 10: 130-35; 204-18; J. Roeber, "The Rotterdam Oil Market," Petroleum 
Economist  (1979) April: 1-15 
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oil spot deals made in oil markets around the globe (see Figure 1 in the 
Appendix).  
 Oil spot markets are as old as the industry itself, but existed mostly 
locally around oil transshipment points. By the late 1960s, the port of 
Rotterdam was possibly the largest of such local spot markets. It functioned 
as a marginal oil products market for balancing supply and demand in 
northwest European (NWE) oil markets. As such MOCs, large commercial oil 
products consumers and independent refiners used it to offload surpluses, 
replenish deficits or market marginal production depending on the current 
and future price structure. Since the late 1960s, price reporting, most 
importantly by Platts, made the Rotterdam market into an important price 
barometer. When the 1973 oil shock hit and many west European countries 
moved to regulate oil prices they did so using price formulae that included 
reference to the Platts assessed prices on the Rotterdam market.19  
Traders played an important role in the market, on the one hand 
supplying MOCs or independent refiners and distributers, on the other hand 
speculating on future prices, in particular around seasonal price movements 
(building stocks in the low season and selling them off in the high season). 
Most traders active on this market were local or regional actors, mostly Dutch 
and German and the vast majority was small scale, trading barge-sized lots of 
oil. However, many of the smaller players were forced out of business when 
prices escalated in the 1973 crisis and the costs of trade and storage went up 
dramatically. Trading was therefore concentrated in the hands of a number of 
bigger trading companies, in particular ones closely related to American 
independent refiners who presumably used the Rotterdam market for their 
marginal source of supply and demand or for arbitrage between US East 
 
19 "The Rotterdam Oil Market," 2.  
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Coast and NWE markets.20 The latter traded cargo-sized lots of oil, i.e. trades 
involving maritime tankers. A few of the Rotterdam trading companies, most 
notably Vitol (today the world’s largest oil trading company) and Vanol, were 
active in both barge and cargo markets.  
The spot market for crude oil that emerged in earnest around 1973, was 
a different category however. First of all, individual trades were larger in 
volume and as a consequence also in value. Secondly, the market was much 
larger geographically. And thirdly, it was much more politically charged. One 
outcome of the oil shocks of the 1970s was a stronger involvement of 
governments in the oil market through price regulations, strategic reserves, 
government to government crude oil deals and increased bartering.21 With 
NOCs in both producing and consuming countries increasingly involved in 
selling and buying crude oil, traders had to have very good contacts in 
producing countries’ administrations and NOCs. On the one hand this was 
made easy by the producers’ distrust of the MOCs. On the other hand, 
producers did not like traders either because they were perceived as steeling 
part of the margin that ought to befall producer countries. But as long as 
crude oil was available from NOCs with limited marketing experience and a 
trader was able to build a relationship with NOC officials from countries like 
Angola, Ecuador, Tunisia or Oman (to name just a few), opportunities 
abounded. The most prolific and certainly the most famous oil trader that 
ceased on these opportunities was Marc Rich.22  
A fugitive of Nazi-occupied Europe, Rich established a career as a 
metals trader with the world’s largest commodity trading company at the 
 
20 Ibid., 4-5. 
21 Øystein Noreng, "State Trading and the Politics of Oil," in State Trading in International 
Markets : Theory and Practice of Industrialized and Developing Countries, ed. M. M. Kostecki 
(London: Macmillan, 1982) 103-16; Oil Politics in the 1980s : Patterns of International Cooperation 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978) 
22 Ammann, The King of Oil: The Secret Lives of Marc Rich, passim; A Craig Copetas, Metal Men: 
Marc Rich and the $10 Billion Scam (New York: Open Road Media, 2014). 
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time, Philip Brothers (Phibro). After stints in New York and Bolivia, Rich 
ended up in Spain in the 1960s. When he learnt that a colleague had done a 
profitable trade buying crude oil in Tunisia and selling it on to an Italian 
refiner in 1969, Rich took initiative and started developing Phibro’s crude oil 
trading book. After a falling out over bonuses, he left Phibro and established 
Marc Rich+Co in 1974, trading out of New York and Switzerland. He sought 
out countries short on crude oil and hard pressed for counterparts willing to 
trade with them, such as Spain, Israel and South Africa, and arranged oil 
supplies through his contacts in Iran and the Soviet Union or through 
exclusive marketing arrangements with for instance Angola. This type of 
trading was very profitable indeed – discreetly matching distressed buyers 
with eager sellers secured a handsome premium – but also highly 
controversial. Nonetheless, the growing appetite among both oil companies 
and NOCs to buy and sell through the spot market, the inexperience of many 
NOCs in trading and the politicized dimensions of the oil market in the 1970s, 
created major though often controversial opportunities for independent oil 
traders. That the price of oil seemed to go up and up – until the mid-1980s – 
helped tremendously.  
 
John Deuss: Shaky start, 1968-1978 
Although Marc Rich is to this day considered the epitome of oil trading, he 
was not alone, although certainly the most well known. The historiography 
on Marc Rich reads indeed as if the history of oil trading is about being the 
quickest, most brazen and least scrupulous dealmaker.23 In such a framing of 
the profession there is a strong tendency to focus on the colorful individual 
instead of questioning the companies they built. Yet, many in this first crop of 
oil traders were indeed colorful individuals, and although they built big 
 
23 Ammann, The King of Oil: The Secret Lives of Marc Rich, passim. 
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companies, they did drag them down in their eventual fall. What is 
interesting is that many of these colorful traders retreated from the market at 
roughly the same time, between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. This 
period marked a transitional phase in the oil market that made the business 
models or trading strategies of the pioneering traders obsolete.24 
 One of those pioneering traders, although much less known outside 
the scene than Rich, is the Dutch entrepreneur Johannes C.M.M. Deuss, 
known colloquially as Jantje or John Deuss. Although his business interests 
came to include more than oil trading – among others banking, logistics, 
investing, ICT – Deuss made his first fortunes with trading oil. The accounts 
of his early beginnings are vague, but the general gist is that he failed to strike 
luck as a car dealer and in some way got involved in the Rotterdam oil market 
in the mid-1960s, reportedly making his first big deal with a Rotterdam 
trading company on a cargo of Egyptian kerosene.25 By the late 1960s, Deuss 
had established his first group of trading companies under the name JOC Oil, 
which appeared to have been an international company from the start.26 The 
JOC group of companies was probably headquartered first in The 
Netherlands through JOC Oil BV and conducted world trading through a 
Panamanian entity, JOC Oil Company SA since 1968. For tax purposes the 
trading was reorganized and from 1973 based in Hamilton, Bermuda.27 Deuss 
used a string of holding companies, trust company services and bearer shares 
alternately born by him or his closest associates to control the group.28 The 
 
24 Clive Gibson-Leitch, “Oil trading terriers that are mostly muzzled in these changing times,” 
Lloyd’s List, 5 February 1999.  
25 Hurt III, "Feasting on the Oil Glut," 210-1. There is no reliable publicly available 
documentation on Deuss’ early career as an oil trader.  
26 Publicly available company registration information shows JOC Oil companies registered 
in the Netherlands and Panama in or around 1968.  
27 Deposition of Francis V. Elias, Case no. CIV-86-1401-P in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Oklahoma, 13 July 1988, 225. 
28 From 1968, the group appears to have been held by JOC Oil SA (Panama), which was 
owned through bearer shares born by Deuss or others. For tax reasons the ownership of most 
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Bermuda company, JOC Oil Ltd, acted as the international trading company, 
while a string of companies in the US owned by JOC Oil (New York), Inc. 
provided services and controlled a number of diversification investments in 
coal, oil exploration, refining, gasoline marketing and petrochemicals.29 The 
company also had offices around the globe in London, Rome, Tokyo and 
Durban (South Africa), all of which were major oil import markets.30 By 1975, 
the JOC group traded oil products and crude oil around the globe, including 
imports of among others Soviet crude oil to the US using Soviet tankers31, was 
active in trading chemical products32, had acquired a license to explore for oil 
in a bloc of Malta offshore acreage,33 traded oil in Latin America34, established 
a coal trading business in Kentucky (US), and was pursuing asset investments 
in oil and chemical refineries in Oklahoma, Malta and Denmark.35  
 
of the group’s companies was centralized in Bermuda in 1973; first under the holding 
company Hydrocarbon Industries Ltd (Bermuda, est. 1973) and subsequently under the 
trading company JOC Oil Ltd (Bermuda, est. 1973), which controlled the group until at least 
1979-80. Source: Elias deposition, 186, 224, 228; Public Library of US Diplomacy (PlusD), 
1974HAMILT00285_b, 3 December 1974. 
29 In 1975 (check) Deuss acquired, through JOC Oil Exploration Company Inc. (Delaware), a 
petrochemical plant, Lowe Chemical Corporation, in McClain County, Oklahoma. According 
to a former employee of JOC Oil Aromatics (the formal owner of the petrochemical facility), 
the plant was bought to strengthen JOC Oil’s position in trading petrochemicals (Deposition 
of Michael M. Fowler, Case no. CIV-86-1401-P in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma, 10 May 1988, 630-684). JOC Coal Inc. (Kentucky) was an 
attempt to gain a trading position in coal. Deuss also acquired a number of gasoline stations 
in New Jersey through JOC Gasoline Marketing Inc. (Elias deposition, 150) and a heating oil 
distribution company in Jersey City, Wellen Oil (Elias deposition, 215). According to a trader 
formerly employed by JOC Oil Inc., a Swiss national named Max Bernegger, JOC Oil Inc. also 
owned a small refinery in Bayonne NJ that primarily ran residual oil (Suzan Mazur, “Mazur: 
John Deuss Oil Trader Max Bernegger Speaks,” Scoop Independent News, 18 December 2006. 
Retrieved from: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0612/S00258.htm, Accessed on 15 August 
2019).  
30 Elias deposition, 190.  
31 ‘Sowjet-Tanker für USA’, Der Spiegel, 27 August 1973, 61.  
32 Advertised job opening for chemical operations supervisor in De Telegraaf, 21 December 
1974.  
33 PlusD, Telegram from US Embassy Valletta Malta to US Secretary of State Washington DC, 
document reference 1974VALLET01722_b, 7 November 1974. 
34 PlusD, 1974QUITO03083_b, 9 May 1974. 
35 PlusD, 1974COPENH00684_b, 18 March 1974; PlusD, 1974VALLET00848_b, 7 May 1974. 
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This rapid expansion of the company originated from around 1973, 
when the company had an exceptionally profitable trading year.36 Under the 
title "JOC, the dynamic independent", the group made an informational 
brochure resembling a consolidated annual report of the holdings of the 
Panamanian and newly established Bermudan holding companies in 1973. 
The First Curacao International Bank, established in 197337 and owned by 
Deuss was also mentioned in the report.38 The report reflected Deuss’ 
ambitions, to develop into an independent, integrated oil company.39 
Although Deuss attempted to keep his own name out of the companies he 
owned, Deuss appears to have organized regular meetings of an executive 
committee consisting of officers of his various companies across the various 
activities of the JOC group, i.e. trading, refining, marketing, exploration.40 
Although the committee had no formal status because the JOC group had no 
formal executive board, it does suggest that Deuss was indeed attempting to 
build an integrated, or at least a diversified company. Nonetheless, the 
committee appears not to have been an attempt to integrate the business 
activities, but a way of pooling information for the benefit of Deuss and to 
discuss potential new investments. Creating synergies or pursuing trading 
opportunities around the assets of the refining and marketing companies 
appear not to have been discussed, although the trading company within the 
group did have a regular meeting where all the regional offices were 
represented.41  
Although the group expanded rapidly between 1973 and 1975, it 
proved difficult to build an integrated company from scratch. The good 
 
36 Elias deposition, 227.  
37 Elias deposition, 239. 
38 Elias deposition, 222-225. 
39 Elias deposition, 228. 
40 Elias deposition, 171-179. 
41 Elias deposition, 178. 
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trading year 1973 was followed by two years in which the trading side of the 
group incurred trading losses. This impaired the ability of the JOC 
companies, in particular the trading unit, to arrange credit lines, which 
directly restricted the trading activities and the ability to grow the trading 
company.42 There appears also to have been a problem with Deuss’ image in 
the oil industry, almost right from the start. This could have been a 
combination of Deuss’ character and approach to business, and his relative 
inexperience in particular with regard to his ambitions beyond trading, such 
as the petrochemical acquisition in Oklahoma, the exploration activities in 
Malta and the rather fanciful plans for the development of new refineries in 
Denmark and Malta.43 In Malta, Deuss seemed to have banked on his good 
relations with the government of prime minister Dominic Mintoff of the 
newly established independent republic of Malta in 1974. Malta’s energy and 
financial position was precarious at the time and its increasingly intimate 
relations with Libya sparked concern in the West that Malta was drifting 
away from the Transatlantic Alliance. Malta also attempted to expand its 
domestic energy production by granting exploration licenses and inviting 
plans for a Maltase refinery. Moreover, Prime Minister Mintoff was shielding 
his energy imports from parliamentary control.44 In 1974, Malta therefore 
presented ample trading opportunities for Deuss but also for his visions of an 
integrated company, no matter how little experience in exploration or refinery 
construction and management he appeared to have.45  
 
42 Elias deposition, 181.  
43 According to Elias, the petrochemical refinery in Oklahoma had a negative cash flow 
throughout the period that it was part of the JOC group and its managers were unable to turn 
it around (Elias deposition, 178). The plans for refineries in Malta and Denmark were met 
with great skepticism (PlusD, 1974COPENH00684_b, 18 March 1974).  
44 PlusD, 1975VALLET00061_b: Libyan oil for Malta, 16 January 1975. 
45 PlusD, 1975VALLET00061_b: Libyan oil for Malta, 16 January 1975; PlusD, 
1974VALLET01722_b:  Oil concession granted JOC Oil Co. Ltd. by Malta, 7 November 1974. 
There was even talk of a cement refinery project developed by JOC Oil.  
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Another problem was the sketchy name that Deuss’ companies 
appeared to have had in the business. US State Department communications 
on Deuss’ business in Malta, for instance, picked up ‘unidentified petroleum 
industry sources’ saying that the major oil companies refused to do business 
with Duess, apparently with regard to his crude oil trading.46 Shell 
International Trading Company, the international crude oil trading division 
of the Shell Group, warned a Shell affiliate to view an offer from JOC Oil 
‘with a great deal of skepticism’.47 A former trader at JOC Oil (USA) Inc. 
reminisced how the major US commodity trader Phibro refused to do 
business with JOC and that he struggled to get any business with the major 
companies.48 Although JOC had been actively trading with countries  like 
Ghana, Zaire, Cuba, Indonesia, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and Mexico in the boom 
years of 1973-4, several of these relationships had been terminated again 
because of JOC’s inability to deliver satisfactory results.49   
In commodity trading, one of the principal risks is the counterparty 
risk, i.e. the risk of the counterparty in a trade defaulting on the terms of the 
contract. Usually such breaches of contract were settled through arbitration 
and, in severe cases, in court. The worst defaults result from a counterparty 
going bankrupt. In such a case, the possibilities for a financial loss are big, 
with slim chances of salvaging something of value from the bankrupt 
company. Pure commodity trading companies in general tend to be highly 
leveraged – meaning that their equity to debt ratio is relatively high – and the 
oil trading companies in the 1970s and 1980s certainly had the name of being 
highly leveraged.50 A glance at the composition and structure of the JOC 
 
46 PlusD, 1974VALLET00848_b, 7 May 1974.  
47 Shell London Archive, IT5: Phantom Offers Vol. 2, internal note by Shell International 
Trading Company, ’Jocoil: Qatar Land crude’, 3 December 1975.  
48 Mazur, “Mazur: John Deuss Oil Trader Max Bernegger Speaks.” 
49 ‘JOC Oil sued,’ Europ-Oil Prices, 21 July 1978.  
50 Pirrong, The Economics of Commodity Trading Firms, 31-32. The problem of leveraged traders 
was a major theme throughout the 1980s, in particular in the 15-day Brent, which traded 
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group suggests that it was Deuss’ policy to keep his group dispersed, with 
ownership relations obscure and equity funding minimal.51 The principal 
external financing for a trading company of the kind of JOC was short term 
trade financing that was covered by the underlying commodity that was 
traded instead of company assets. If such short term financing was cut off it 
meant the end of the company’s ability to trade. This credit risk was 
inhibiting JOC’s trading in the mid-1970s.  
The final nail in JOC’s coffin was a major deal with the Soviet state 
exporting company Soyuznefteeksport (SNE) in 1975. JOC had before been 
trading Soviet crude oil and products as well as rumored deals with other 
countries behind the Iron Curtain.52 The 1975 contract was rolled over into 
1977, comprising a value of around USD 500 million, representing some 4 
million tons of Soviet crude oil or two thirds of JOC’s entire disposable crude 
supply for the year.53 Although the previous contract seems to have 
functioned without trouble, the 1977 deal went badly wrong. The result was 
decades long litigation between Deuss and SNE, with SNE claiming that 
Deuss failed to pay for a number of shipments of crude oil, totaling some 100 
million US dollars, while Deuss claimed that SNE failed to comply with the 
contract specifications, particular in quality and the timing of delivery.54  
Overnight, Deuss became a famous man, establishing his image as a 
shrewd businessman as well as a ruthless trader. Without going into the 
particulars of the deal and the ensuing litigation, its main ingredients are 
 
future deliveries of Brent blend crude oil through complex chains of buying and selling 
forward contracts. These so-called daisy chains were highly sensitive to counterparty 
defaults, which might lead to breaking the chain and causing financial repercussions for the 
entire chain (Weekly Petroleum Argus (WPA), ‘Brent: The big three’, 1 August 1988; WPA, 21 
November 1988, 1, 4). 
51 Elias deposition, 182. 
52 PlusD, 1974COPENH00684_b, 18 March 1974.  
53 Elias deposition, 190; ‘JOC Oil sued,’ Europ-Oil Prices, 21 July 1978. 
54 See for instance: R.J. Blom, "Jocoil," in Slavenburg : De Ondergang Van Een Bank (Utrecht: Het 
Spectrum, 1983) 39-46 The following is a general rendition of the case. 
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interesting. It also exposes some of Deuss’ revered as well as his less revered 
qualities as a trader and businessman and led to the demise of the JOC group 
and Deuss’ restart in oil trading with the Transworld group of companies. 
There were three main ingredients in the conflict between Deuss and SNE: the 
price, the contract and the financing. With regard to the price, before 1975, 
Deuss had already accomplished to bring Soviet oil to the US, a highly 
contentious trade but one that became feasible in the wake of the 1973 oil 
embargo, which heightened United States’ preoccupation with security of 
supply, paradoxically leading to higher imports.55 A large share of the 1977 
contract was allegedly meant for the US, but the profitability of this trade 
depended on the differential between Soviet oil and other US imports of 
comparable crudes, most notably from the Middle East as well as refinery 
margins and the federally regulated product prices in the US.56 Over the 
course of 1977, however, this window appears to have closed for two reasons. 
Firstly, while OPEC prices were stable or slightly increasing, there was 
overcapacity in refining, depressing oil product prices on the spot market.57 
Secondly, the Soviet oil export price formula was changed to reduce the 
 
55 Paul Sabin, "Crisis and Continuity in U.S. Oil Politics, 1965–1980," Journal of American 
History 99 (2012) 1: 177-86. Between 1972 and 1975, US petroleum imports from the Soviet 
Union ranged between 0.4 and 1.5 million tons per annum (Source: ‘Soviet said to bar bid by 
U.S. to buy oil at a discount,’ The New York Times, 12 October 1975). 
56 Ibid., 184. Federally regulated oil prices created opportunities for oil price fraud. Crude oil 
from different sources were subject to different price limits, distinguishing between oil from 
old fields, new fields and imported crude oil. Opportunities to illegally switch crude oil in 
order to drive up the price attracted “hundreds of crude oil resellers”, i.e. intermediaries, to 
set up schemes. It is quite possible that Deuss partook in such schemes, as did Marc Rich. 
Rich faced an investigation and trial because his American partners told the Justice 
Department they were holding cash generated in price spinning schemes for Rich. Deuss was 
never investigated for it (as far as I’m aware off) but it was a very attractive and profitable, if 
illegal, way of making money. See also: 96th US Congress, House of Representatives (1980), 
‘White Collar Crime in the Oil Industry,’ Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy 
and Power of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the Subcommittee on 
Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary (Washington: US Government Printing Office). 
57 Adelman, The Genie out of the Bottle: World Oil since 1970, 144; Roeber, "The Rotterdam Oil 
Market," 5, 8-9. 
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discount of Soviet crude to the rising OPEC prices.58 In addition, the Soviets 
suddenly raised their export price by 22.5 per cent in January 1977, to the 
dismay of importers in both Eastern Europe and the West.59 Deuss appears to 
have felt the sting of both as he was rumored to have accepted too high prices 
in the 1977 contract, which obstructed profitable imports into the US of the 
first number of shipments.60 Deuss took delivery of several cargoes but 
refused to pay for them, allegedly on the basis that the deliveries were not 
according to the agreed schedule. But it appears that the price was the main 
problem Indeed, several of the cargoes appeared to have floated around in 
New York harbor in the spring of 1977 before they were eventually sold at a 
loss.61 Defaulting on the payment for the remainder of the contract was 
possible because there appeared to be an irregularity with the contract, in 
particular that it only carried one signature from a competent SNE official 
instead of the required two, which according to Deuss rendered the contract 
invalid and its conditions non-binding. This has been construed as taking the 
opportunity to defraud SNE. When SNE subsequently lifted the Letter of 
Credit underlying the contract, the issuer, Slavenburg’s Bank in the 
Netherlands, claimed it only issued a Letter of Credit the first shipment under 
the contract to an amount of USD 4.6 million, leaving SNE with a large 
unsettled bill. The case was only settled in the early 1990s.  
It is unclear to what extent Deuss profited from the deal, but it did 
make further trading through the JOC group impossible.62 The legal fallout 
tied the JOC companies into ongoing litigation, exposed the shaky credit 
conditions of the company as well as question the ability of JOC to honor 
 
58 ‘East Europe Also to Face Soviet Oil Price Rise,’ The New York Times, 14 December 1976; 
"The Rotterdam Oil Market," 5. 
59 ‘Iran Emerging as Major Alternative In Eastern Europe's Search for Oil,’ The New York 
Times, 21 November 1977. 
60 PlusD, 1977STATE275307_c: More on JOC Oil's dealings with Soviets, 17 November 1977. 
61 ‘JOC Oil sued,’ Europ-Oil Prices, 21 July 1978. 
62 Elias deposition, 191-193. 
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existing or future commitments. Following the loss-making years of 1974-5, 
Deuss decided to establish two new companies in Bermuda, Transworld Oil 
Ltd (trading company replacing JOC Oil Ltd) and Transworld Energy Ltd 
(holding company replacing Hydrocarbon Industries Ltd and JOC Oil Ltd) as 
the new core companies for the transformation of the JOC group.63 For two 
years, the JOC companies and the new Transworld companies co-existed but 
when the conflict with SNE struck JOC ceased trading and Deuss’ trading 
activities were transferred to Transworld Oil (TWO).64 The JOC companies in 
the US changed their names into Transworld and the shares were transferred 
to Transworld Oil Ltd and so were the JOC offices around the globe.65  
 
Boom and bust: Growth and demise of the TWO group, 1978-1992  
With Transworld’s Bermuda companies taking over the shares and offices of 
the JOC Oil companies in the US and elsewhere in the world, Deuss was able 
to refuel his ambitions in becoming a big player in all stages of the oil 
industry. Despite his apparently tainted image in the oil industry, Deuss had 
a reputation as a shrewd trader, which according to Elias allowed him to 
restart under the TWO banner without any problems of attracting the 
required trade financing. He did have a problem with sourcing crude oil, 
however, given that the 1977 contract with SNE represented two thirds of his 
annual supply. Deuss appears to have invested strongly in market research 
and intelligence gathering, for example by hiring the services of market and 
risk analysts.  
One famous example was Theodore G. “Ted” Shackley, a CIA deputy 
director who, after his retirement in 1979, became a private security 
 
63 Both companies were registered in Bermuda on 30 June 1975 (Registrar of Companies, 
Bermuda, https://www.roc.gov.bm/roc/rocweb.nsf/public+register/t+public+companies).  
64 Elias deposition, 193. 
65 Elias deposition, 182, 184-185, 189-190.  
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consultant and risk analyst. Deuss was apparently introduced to Shackley 
through a former Shell director, Michael Corrie, who worked for Deuss, and 
allegedly knew Shackley from his time at Shell Vietnam in the 1960s.66 Deuss 
had an open-ended contract with Shackley’s risk analysis company RAI. For a 
time, at least until the mid-1980s, Shackley worked exclusively for Deuss.67 
Shackley gathered intelligence on, for instance, North Sea oil production or 
the progression of the Iran-Iraq War.68 He was also involved in brokering 
trading deals or originating crude oil for Deuss, for which Shackley in turn 
used his own network to source potential deals, for instance in Iran, Nigeria 
and Oman.69 Iran badly needed money to finance arms purchases for the war 
with Iraq and was willing to be creative with ways of boosting exports of its 
crude oil. Nigeria in the mid-1980s went through a number of violent political 
transitions; always a good time to leverage connections to the new regime 
looking to increase revenue through oil exports. It was part of Shackley’s job 
to seek out such opportunities for Deuss. Shackley also arranged ways to 
obscure the links between the source and destination of trades, developing 
intermediate parties or cutouts that would either refine or store cargoes of 
crude oil or function as recipients only on paper to obscure the final 
destination.70 This and other constructions were the core structures with 
 
66 Mazur, “Mazur: John Deuss Oil Trader Max Bernegger Speaks.” 
67 Shipping Research Bureau. Shipping Research Bureau Archief (SRBA). International Institute 
of Social History, collection number ARCH03046, inventory number 389, Deposition of 
Theodore G. Shackley, US Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and 
the Nicaraguan Opposition (15 September 1987), 19-20. 
68 SRBA, Shackley deposition, 19,  
69 Shackley recalled a deal involving an arms-for-crude oil barter deal between Iran and 
Portugal that he was brokering, in which Deuss was involved through a processing and 
offtake deal that involved a Portuguese refinery processing the Iranian crude and Deuss 
marketing the refined product in the European market. This was part of a broader pattern in 
which a disparate array of individuals that could provide access to producer or consumer 
states (SRBA, Shackley deposition 15 September 1987, 96-97; SRBA, Shackley deposition 21 
September 1987, 358-359, 378-379; Mazur, “Mazur: John Deuss Oil Trader Max Bernegger 
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which Deuss engineered his arguably biggest and most profitable trading 
scheme: supplying Apartheid South Africa with oil during the 1980s, evading 
the unofficial oil embargo that many oil exporting countries, including OPEC 
since 1978, maintained.  
Throughout the 1970s, only Iran had continued to export to South 
Africa, and supplied 96 per cent of the country’s crude imports. Iran cut off all 
supplies after the Iranian revolution in 1979. South Africa established a state-
led import scheme that paid large premiums to any company supplying 
crude to South Africa.71 Deuss landed at least one very large contract for up to 
6 million tons of crude oil supply annually between 1981 and 1983. Deuss 
negotiated the deal with the South African state procurement company SFF 
on behalf of the Middle East country that was willing to go through to move 
its oil. Deuss drove a hard bargain and negotiated a premium, which he 
shared with the producer on the basis that Deuss would arrange for the 
logistics in a manner that would keep the origin of the crude oil secret.72 For 
that purpose he used a number of shell companies operated by TWO 
directors and used forged documents, fake destinations, ship-to-ship transfers 
on the high seas and other methods that made it hard to trace shipments of 
Middle Eastern crude oil to South Africa.73  
 From the South African contracts, it became apparent that Deuss had 
established very strong contacts in the Middle East, particularly with discount 
sellers such as Oman or Dubai.74 Although Deuss dealt in a range of crudes 
intermittently there was apparently a major relation being established with 
Oman. Oman was not a member of OPEC and very much interested in 
 
71 SRBA, 822, Advocate-General Report to the leader of the House of Assembly, 27 June 1984, 
8-9.  
72 SRBA, 822, Advocate-General Report, 16-30.  
73 SRBA, 393, SRB, John Deuss – Transworld Oil : Zuid Afrika’s belangrijkste olieleverancier, 
January 1985; SRBA, 388 Deuss TWO re Comet Oil e.a. 
74 ‘Linking Crude Deals to End-Users Key in US Refinery Sale’, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1 
July 1985, 1. 
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boosting its role in the international oil industry.75 Over the 1980s, Deuss 
became one of the principal resellers of Omani crude oil, in some years even 
selling more into the spot market than equity producer Shell (see Table 1 in 
Appendix). Although traders were generally despised by producing countries 
for stealing their margins, Deuss had apparently established an image, if not a 
proven ability, to fetch a premium on Middle Eastern crude sales, some of 
which flowed back to the producers.76  
Cash rich and keen to expand beyond just producing oil, Middle 
Eastern producer countries were looking for opportunities to invest in 
refining and marketing abroad to establish more control over the marketing 
of their exports. That opportunity arrived when in early 1986 the oil price 
collapsed as OPEC was no longer able to hold its price level under falling 
demand. Overcapacity in refining and low prices resulted in oil companies, in 
particular smaller integrated independents in the US to offload their less 
efficient refineries. Traders played a big role in picking up those refineries, 
and it was alleged that they did so on behalf of Latin American and Middle 
Eastern producing countries to give them direct access to the American 
consumer.77 In September 1985, Deuss was rumored to make a similar move 
for his relations in the Middle East when he bought the US East Coast assets 
of the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) to form Atlantic Petroleum 
 
75 ’The High-Octane World of John Deuss’, Business Week, 30 June 1986, 59-60. Deuss had 
seconded a former International Energy Agency official, Herman T. Franssen to act as Dubai 
to act as economic adviser to Said bin Ahmed Al-Shanfari, the oil minister of Oman (Wall 
Street Journal, ‘John Deuss Credited With Role in Plan For 'World OPEC', 14 June 1988).  
76 An analysis of Deuss contract with South Africa in the early 1980s found that, instead of 
earning the contractually agreed maximum premium of 2,50 US dollars, Deuss often netted a 
multiple, primarily from unclarity in the contract regarding the proper market price for the 
crude imports and the appropriate marker prices to establish it (SRBA, 663 Materials 
provided to SRB by Kevin Davis on 26 March 1992, ’Analysis of the Advocate-General’s 
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Company (APC). APC consisted of a sophisticated refinery making up 
around 10 per cent of US East Coast refining capacity and 576 service stations 
across the East Coast. 78 Later in the year, APC acquired a British retailer, 
Ultramar, expanding the retail network to 1000 service stations and a number 
of heating oil terminals.79 Whether or not Deuss made the acquisitions on 
behalf of Middle Eastern producers, he did manage to turn ARCO’s ailing 
East Coast business into a growing and profitable company. Deuss has never 
publicly commented on the Middle East link in the accomplishment of his 
1970s ambition to become an integrated oil company. It appears at least 
plausible that Deuss saw the writing on the wall and the investment 
opportune. All through the 1980s, producer country NOCs were looking to 
integrate downstream in major consumers markets (). If he managed to turn 
APC into a profitable company, he stood to make a good return selling it 
onwards to an expanding NOC.80 It appears that Deuss was convinced that 
the NOCs were on the rise and that after the price drop in 1986, something 
should be done to bring stability to the oil markets. At a London conference in 
June 1988 – Oil & Money – Deuss proposed an unprecedented cooperation 
between OPEC and non-OPEC countries. Non-OPEC backers of the plan were 
led by Oman where Deuss was considered by then to be an advisor to the 
government.81  
Whatever Deuss longer term plans with APC were, they were cut short 
by adverse results of his trading company, although he denied that at the 
time.82 Over the course of the 1980s, TWO had become a major global oil 
trader, considered to be the second or third largest trader together with the 
 
78 ‘Linking Crude Deals to End-Users Key in US Refinery Sale’, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1 
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82 Tanner, ‘Oil Trader Sets Accord to Sell Refinery to Sun’. 
Working paper. Do not cite without written consent by the author 
 23 
US commodity house Phibro and Marc Rich+Co.83 Apart from a big reseller of 
Oman crude oil, TWO was also highly active in the Brent market. The Brent 
market had been growing since the late 1970s, but during the 1980s it 
developed into the most active and important oil spot market in the world.84 
The origins of the market are not entirely clear, but important contributors 
were the UK tax system and the British National Oil Company (BNOC). 
BNOC was the collector of royalty and participation oil from oil production 
on the UK continental shelf on behalf of the UK Government. As such the 
company was long on crude oil but had no proprietary storage or refineries. 
All it did was set the UK Official Selling Price (OSP) and market its oil 
through the spot market or term contracts, providing a sizable chunk of oil 
that could be traded freely (unlike Saudi Arabia, for instance, which barred 
reselling to certain destinations and preferred term contracting). The 
producing companies on the UK continental shelf were taxed according to the 
market price of oil, which was established by tracking arms length sales in the 
spot market. This provided an incentive for the major North Sea producers to 
sell and buy through the spot market instead of moving the oil internally 
through their subsidiaries. This so-called tax spinning of North Sea crude 
created a second impetus for the growth of the spot market.  
The significance of the spot market was twofold. Firstly, it provided a 
means to establish the current market price for oil, which developed quickly 
into a marker price against which others grades of crude were priced. 
Secondly, Shell and BP organized a forward market based on future North 
Sea cargoes that helped to establish a future price of oil and created the 
possibility to hedge against future price uncertainty. In the forward market, 
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as in a future market, the contract to buy or sell oil is traded, not the 
commodity itself. The death of the long-term contract and the growth of the 
spot market had created a more volatile oil price, which producers, 
consumers and traders increasingly wanted to hedge. Most oil trading in the 
first half of the 1980s was done on outright price exposure, meaning that any 
long position uncovered by a future commitment by a buyer at a fixed price 
was exposed to the flat price risk. From 1988, the International Petroleum 
Exchange in London offered a futures contract on Brent blend crude oil but 
before that the Brent forward or 15-day Brent market was the only means to 
hedge against future price uncertainty.  
The Brent market became a central institution in the oil market but it 
was based on approximately 40 cargoes of crude oil loaded at the Sullom Voe 
terminal in the Shetland Islands each month. The forward trade in these 40 
contracts reached a multiple of that number but only if they were indeed 
traded. A frequent trading play was to corner the market by buying up the 
majority of the contracts for the front month in the hope of driving up the 
price by squeezing the physical supply in the front month. Shortly before 
paper contracts would turn into actually loaded cargoes and squeezed buyers 
looking frantically for oil drove up the price, the trader would release his 
position and sell at the higher price. This was a tricky strategy because the 
trader basically took an outright speculative position and tied up an 
enormous amount of short term financing commitments to the acquired 
position. Moreover, if producers chose to raise production temporarily, or 
supply from other areas was plentiful, the corner might fail to take effect or 
worse, the price might actually fall more rapidly than the trader could 
liquidate his position, saddling him with a large loss. This was exactly what 
happened when TWO attempted to corner the Brent market for January 1988. 
After earlier attempts, of which the corner for the loading month of April 1987 
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had been particularly successful, the January 1988 corner went wrong.85 Slack 
demand in Europe and easy availability of other crudes forced TWO to take 
physical delivery on most of the contracts it had amassed for January 
loading.86  
The failed corner had large effects for Deuss and TWO, which 
allegedly lost in the region of 200 million US dollars on the scheme. Although 
Deuss claimed it was unrelated, he put up Atlantic Petroleum Company for 
sale in the Spring of 1988 and sold it to Sun Co. in July 1988.87 The sale was 
part of a restructuring of the TWO group, which slimmed down not only its 
assets but also its trading operations. The office in Tokyo was closed and the 
number of staff throughout the group reduced.88 It is quite probable that the 
burden of the failed corner weighed heavy on the group. However, the corner 
also had a large impact on the Brent market and subsequent attempts by 
majority producers Shell and BP to improve the operations of the market and 
reduce the possibility of the kind of price volatility created by corners. This 
was essential for the market’s future because such corners reduced the 
effectiveness of the market as a price marker and hedging instrument, and 
harmed the confidence in the institution. As more and more producing 
countries were using reference to the Brent price in their own pricing 
formulae for sales into the Atlantic Basin, it was imperative that the Brent 
market operated without large distortions. Moreover, Wall Street banks and 
in particular Goldman Sachs, through its commodity trading affiliate J Aron, 
were taking a much stronger position in the market since 1986. This made a 
constant presence in the market a prerequisite to turn a profit, which required 
a large financial commitment, something in particular the relatively smaller 
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traders struggled with.89 Essentially, the smaller speculative traders were 
forced out of the market, and this appeared to include TWO.  
 Throughout 1980s, TWO had been mainly present in two markets. Up 
to 1984, it was primarily involved in trading Middle Eastern grades, but from 
1984 around 70 per cent of its spot trading activity was in the Brent market 
(see Figure 3 in appendix). TWO’s presence in the market, however, shows a 
downward trend over the course of the 1980s, in particular since 1988, with 
the exception of two spikes of activity in 1989 and 1990. The last trade by 
TWO was recorded in October 1996 but the last month that TWO had a 
substantial trading position was in July 1991 (see Figure 4 in appendix). It is 
impossible to say why Deuss appears to have downsized TWO’s trading after 
July 1991 but it appears that the development of the market and world trade 
in the post-Soviet era was incompatible with his trading strategy and his 
wider view on the oil industry. The many attempted corners of the Brent 
market that TWO was involved in over the course of the 1980s and Deuss big 
role in supplying Apartheid South Africa suggest a trading strategy fully 
focused on profiting from few but exceptional market distortions with high 
returns (or losses), instead of a trading approach based on a regular market 
presence and pursuing arbitrage opportunities with lower but less risky 
returns. Such a strategy, however, would require a stable, high-volume 
logistics based trading operation, something that Deuss apparently was not 
committed to. Deuss’ apparent belief that the NOCs of oil producing 
countries would soon take over the oil industry and market seems to have 
guided both his strong ties to countries like Oman and his entry into the US 
refining market. After divesting APC and downsizing his trading company in 
1988, Deuss seems to have banked on what he had left, his good connections 
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in the Middle East.90 By 1992, Deuss had obtained Omani exploration licenses 
in blocs onshore and offshore and a stake in a refinery.91 
 
Epilogue: Deuss and the Oman Oil Company, 1992-1995 
On 20 July 1992, Deuss and the Oman Ministry of Oil incorporated the Oman 
Oil Company Ltd (OOC) in Bermuda. OOC was to be the vehicle for Oman’s 
foreign oil investments and Deuss acted as its president and principal 
dealmaker. Right from the start Deuss had lined up a number of investments 
ranging from the US to Thailand and India.92 But Deuss’ and OOC’s big break 
came with the opening of Kazakhstan’s oil reserves to foreign investments in 
the early 1990s. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, the centrally planned economies of the Eastern Bloc were restructured. 
In Russia, the energy sector was looked at for providing the majority of 
government revenues required to finance the economic transition of the 
country. A similar view was taken in other energy-rich former Soviet states 
such as Kazakhstan. In both states, developing and maintaining capacity to 
export oil and gas was given top priority. But while proven reserves in 
Kazakhstan were abundant, investment capital was not.93  
Kazakhstan wanted to develop its energy sector independently of 
Russia or China to protect its fledgling status as an independent country. 
However, the country is landlocked and has no obvious ways of exporting its 
oil. Moreover, the Soviet inherited pipelines and refineries were not attuned 
to the development of an independent Kazakh oil industry. Both export 
pipelines and refineries to process Kazakhstan’s own crude oil were lacking. 
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As a result Kazakhstan was reliant upon Russia for its liquid fuel supplies as 
well as for the export of crude oil under very unfavourable terms of trade.94 
And because Kazakhstan was neither a crucial buyer of Russian oil nor an 
important supplier, the country needed other partners to develop an 
independent and viable energy sector. The development of the energy sector 
became a vital part of Kazakhstan’s geopolitical strategy to escape the 
potential fate of becoming yet again a Russian satellite economy. Out of this 
realisation stemmed a number of pipeline projects to provide the country 
with export outlets. Possibilities ranged from pumping oil to the Russian 
Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, Turkey or Iran and during the 1990s and 
2000s all of these were pursued; some successfully, others not.  
Apart from creating an export infrastructure, Kazakhstan wanted to 
attract foreign investments for its energy sector to add to the country’s limited 
domestic availability of capital and know-how. In the early 1990s, foreign 
firms signed exploration leases, among them Chevron in the massive Tengiz 
oil and gas field on the northeastern shore of the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan’s 
success in attracting foreign capital stung the Russian leadership, which 
reasoned that Kazakhstan’s competition for foreign investments and its 
subsequent output growth could hurt Russia’s own drive to attract foreign 
investments. It could also impact prices and Russia’s access to new foreign 
markets. Russia was therefore determined to use its leverage – in the guise of 
the pipeline infrastructure – to frustrate Kazakhstan’s policies.95 However, 
because Kazakhstan had already attracted some sizable investments from 
Western oil companies, Russia could not overtly obstruct Kazakh interests but 
needed to operate carefully. Because Oman was the first country that had 
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provided independent Kazakhstan with a sizable foreign loan, Oman and 
thus Deuss’ OOC enjoyed a privileged position in the country.  
In mid-1992, Deuss succeeded in aligning Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and 
Russia into signing an agreement for the Caspian Pipeline Company (CPC), in 
which OOC also participated.96 This gigantic deal promised to open export 
routes for Kazakhstan while maintaining its independence from Russia. The 
only problem was that Chevron, the main prospective producer in the 
Tenghiz field refused to join the CPC, even though lack of large capacity 
export pipeline strongly inhibited Chevron’s production and exports from 
Tenghiz.97 Chevron’s principal ache was the position of Deuss and Oman, 
which contributed only a sliver of capital to the project but maintained that 
they were entitled to a stake in the export pipeline.98 Chevron continued its 
opposition to Oman’s position in CPC in the face of strong Kazakh support 
for the country. Kazakhstan's deputy oil and gas minister, Anatoly Lobayev, 
maintained that "Oman was the first state to recognise an independent 
Kazakhstan, and it was the first to give us credit."99 However, a cabinet 
reshuffle in October 1994 putting a former Chevron employee in charge of the 
Kazakh oil ministry reduced the leverage of Oman in CPC.100 Chevron 
persisted and in January 1996 Deuss decided to pull OOC from CPC. 
Simultaneously, his role in OOC was strongly reduced after the death of 
Deuss’ strongest ally in Oman, Finance Minister Qais al-Zawawi, in 1995.101 
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25; ‘New Caucasian pipeline’, Weekly Petroleum Argus, 22 July 1992.  
97 ‘Kazakhstan: pipeline disputes slow development of production’, Weekly Petroleum Argus, 
10 October 1994. 
98 'Oman to back off or back out', Weekly Petroleum Argus, 10 October 1994. 
99 ‘Kazakhstan: pipeline disputes slow development of production’. 
100 ‘Kazakhstan: cabinet reshuffle rewrites the rules for Chevron’, Weekly Petroleum Argus, 31 
October 1994. 
101 ‘Oman: new deals signed in exploration tender’, Weekly Petroleum Argus, 24 June 1996.  
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His strong position and taste for dashing and high-risk investment projects on 
behalf of OOC had raised eyebrows and tempers with foreign investors and 
government officials in Oman.102 An example was Deuss’ involvement in 
developing Oman’s gas export sector, primarily through a gas pipeline to 
India, but the principal oil and gas producer in Oman, Shell, accelerated its 
own Oman LNG project and forced Deuss and OOC to abandon the Indian 
pipeline plan.103 By the end of 1996, OOC had severed its links with Deuss. 
The marketing of 5.5 million ton of crude oil that Deuss still undertook based 
on a term contract was taken over by Petroleum Development Oman, the 
state-owned oil company.104 Deuss role in Oman was largely done and 
although Deuss today is still active as an investor in the oil industry, he no 
longer makes headlines as a renowned, if eternally enigmatic, trader and 
dealmaker.  
 
Conclusion 
Based on the case of Dutch oil trader John Deuss, this paper questioned how 
and why oil trading companies have emerged and evolved during the 
formative years of the oil market and why some endured and expanded while 
others grew large but disappeared again. Deuss had an ambitious but shaky 
start in the 1970s. He established a globally operating group with his JOC 
companies but it was fraught with controversy and financial problems, 
culminating in the major conflict with Soviet state exporter SNE. Deuss’ 
second go at being a global trader and oil company was stronger and more 
successful. But his apparent knack for risky trading schemes did not always 
 
102 ‘Oman: OOC reels from Caspian Pipeline debacle’, Weekly Petroleum Argus, 27 November 
1995; ‘Oman: 'formidable' spending casts doubt over foreign ventures’, Weekly Petroleum 
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Projects: Qatar, Oman, and Yemen (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 1998). 
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pay off, and became increasingly incompatible with a formalizing, maturing 
oil market over the course of the 1980s. Facing a reduced role in trading, 
Deuss redirected his energies toward what he possibly perceived as the long 
term trend of expanding producer country NOCs. Banking on his excellent 
contacts in the Middle East dating back to his South Africa deals, Deuss 
become the principal dealmaker for Oman’s foreign investment company. 
With a general appetite for daring projects, Deuss sharply sensed the 
opportunities arising from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Oman became an 
early backer of Kazakh independence and as a reward Deuss and Oman 
gained a stake in the country’s vast untapped oil wealth, only to be ousted 
again as Kazakhstan relied less and less on the backing of small states such as 
Oman.  
It appears that the fall of the communist bloc and the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union created a new trade and investment environment, in which 
the oil industry, both NOCs and MOCs, had no use any longer for middlemen 
such as Deuss. MOCs invested freely in former communist countries. 
Furthermore, the maturation of oil markets and the implementation of market 
price formulae in oil trading and contracting had possibly rendered MOC-
NOC relations less politically charged. Foreign investments in producer 
countries became thinkable again, while simultaneously NOCs expanded 
their capabilities and foreign investments. The oil industry in the 1990s 
enjoyed lowered political barriers for international trade and investments, 
and with it disappeared the need or toleration for traders like Deuss.  
Major disruptions still occurred of course, such as the Balkan Wars, the 
Iraq War and the subsequent Oil-for-Food program or other exceptional 
situations giving traders the opportunities and incentives to do shady deals, 
but the general impression is that by the mid-1990s it was no longer enough 
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to build a company on.105 In terms of the theory of the trading firm, it seems 
that Deuss’ undeniable entrepreneurial skill was mainly to seek out big 
occasional profits from rare and exceptional disruptions instead of the smaller 
but less risky returns from frequent but less profitable arbitrage 
opportunities. As such it appears plausible that his companies could flourish 
in times when markets were opaque, the world politically divided and the oil 
industry struggling to adapt to a new system of allocating supplies. Once the 
market had occupied a central place in the global oil industry the vested 
interests in its operation made for a more mature, formalized, transparent and 
globally integrated market in which the exploits of Deuss’ trading companies 
had no place any more. Deuss faced adaptation or retreat and he appeared to 
have settled for the latter in the early 1990s. These interpretations, however, 
are mere hypotheses and subsequent drafts of this paper require additional 
sources, most importantly oral sources, on the fate of Deuss’ Transworld Oil 
group, and a more extensive review of the literature on the development of 
the oil markets in the 1980s and 1990s.  
  
 
105 Gibson-Leitch, “Oil trading terriers that are mostly muzzled in these changing times.” 
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Appendix 
Figure 1 Percentage of deals by market participants, August 1983 to 
December 1984 
 
Source: Argus Media, crude oil deals database. Note: the database contains spot sales of 
crude oil reported to Argus Media and runs from 1975 to 2015. Argus operated and still 
operates a system of voluntary reporting by market participants. The database therefor does 
not contain a full picture of market activity but anecdotal estimates range between 30 to 40 
per cent of all deals. Entries in the database started to identify seller and buyer from 1 August 
1983 onwards. Figure 1 presents the first available snapshot of the number of reported deals 
by participants in the market. ‘Bank’ refers to banks engaging in oil trading. ‘NOC’ refers to a 
state-owned oil entities. ‘Producer/refiner’ refers to an integrated private oil company. 
‘Refiner’ refers to independent, non-integrated refiners. ‘Sogo sosha’ refers to the Japanese 
general trading companies. ‘Trader’ refers to independent oil trading companies. ‘Unknown’ 
refers to sellers or buyers that were unidentified.  
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Figure 2 Number of reported spot deals, 1975-85 
 
Source: Argus Media, crude oil deals database. 
 
 
Table 1 Transworld Oil sales of Oman crude oil, 1983-1997 
 TWO nr of sales 
of Oman crude 
TWO share in sales 
of Oman crude 
Rank 
1983 5 14% 2 
1984 24 27% 1 
1985 10 3% 8 
1986 18 10% 4 
1987 16 12% 1 
1988 21 18% 1 
1989 23 11% 3 
1990 29 8% 4 
1991 6 3% 15 
1992 3 1% 17 
1993 10 5% 4 
1994 16 8% 2 
1995 6 3% 8 
1996 2 1% 25 
1997 0 0% 33 
Source: Argus Media, crude oil deals database. 
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Figure 3 Percentage of TWO sales by grade of crude oil 
 
Source: Argus Media, crude oil deals database. 
 
Figure 4 TWO total market activity, 1983-1996 
 
Source: Argus Media, crude oil deals database. 
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